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Unbundling School
Aaron Saiger *
Fordham University School of Law
Consider cable television. To subscribe to cable in the United States is
to pay for either more or less TV than you actually want. Cable
companies offer customers a relatively small menu of choices. You can
have the basic package, or the standard, or the luxe; in some markets you
can get a sports package, or one targeted at kids. Each of these packages
offers access to a subset, selected by the cable company, of the universe of
channels available. If you want some particular channel, you have to
subscribe to a package that contains it. That package likely also contains
many channels in which you have no interest. But cable packages are, not
only by definition but by design, package deals. Customers must take the
bitter with the sweet.1
Traditional schooling is likewise a package. 2 A   child   attends   “a”  
school. That single institution provides instruction across a range of
subjects, along with facilities, classmates, discipline, and extracurricular
activities. If you would rather do without some of its offerings, you may
*

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to participants in
the 2019 International School Choice and Reform Conference for their comments and
suggestions, and to the Fordham Law School and the Fordham Law Library for their
support.
1
See Jade Brewster, Cracking the Cable Conundrum: Government Regulation of à la
Carte Models in the Cable Industry, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 20, 23 (2014); Adam
D. Rennhoff & Konstantinos Serfes, The Role of Upstream-Downstream Competition on
Bundling Decisions: Should Regulators Force Firms to Unbundle?, 18 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 547, 549 (2009). Many providers also bundle cable, phone, and
internet service into a single, indivisible package. See Note, Enabling Television
Competition in A Converged Market, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2083, 2088, 2093 (2013).
2
Bundling and unbundling in the television industry have recently become popular
analogies for problems in, and reform of, higher education. See, e.g., Megan M.
Carpenter, Legal Education Unbundled (and Rebundled), 50 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 265,
266–67 (2019) (analogizing TV unbundling to the reform of legal education); Mark
Garrett Cooper & John Marx, Why We Love to Hate English Professors, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Nov.  30,  2018,  at  B4  (describing  the  “handful  of  majors  …  that  one  could  find  at    
pretty  much  any  postsecondary  institution”  as  “basic  cable  channels”);;  Karen  Sloane,  
Ahead of the Curve: Law School Unbundled, LAW.COM, March 26, 2019,
https://www.law.com/2019/03/26/ahead-of-the-curve-law-school-unbundled/
(analogizing an executive education program to Netflix, and noting that in comparison
“traditional legal education is a lot like a Direct TV package”).
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abstain   only   at   the   school’s   grace,   and   subject   to   its   often   constraining
rules. If you want some class or activity the school does not offer, you are
stuck—unless you live in a jurisdiction with school choice, or have the
means to pay for services on the private market. In those latter cases, you
can seek out a school that offers a particular educational good. Likewise,
a student looking to avoid a particular kind of thing tries to find a school
whose program does not require it. Even then, however, the choosing
student   gets   the   chosen   school’s   whole   program,   which   likely includes
many other things that she might have preferred in a different form, or
even preferred not to have had at all.
Cable TV need not be provided under a package-deal model. Quite the
contrary: cable companies deployed it in response to particular market,
economic, business, and regulatory conditions. 3 Lately, though, those
same forces—markets and regulators—have dragged the industry some
considerable distance away from its preferences for bundling. 4 Customers
are less willing than ever to buy  what  they  don’t  want  in  order  to  get  what  
they do want, living as they do in a world where streaming technology
makes it possible and practical to pick and choose. 5 For-pay streaming
services are also, of course, bundles of a sort; you can only stream the
shows they offer, and each service offers a different set. But one is often
able to pay à la carte.6 Free streaming is entirely unbundled. Overall,
3

See Brewster, supra note 1, at 26–27; Keith Brown & Peter J. Alexander, Bundling in
Cable Television: A Pedagogical Note with a Policy Option, 6 INT’L J. MEDIA MGMT.
162, 163 (2004) (some  types  of  bundling  act  “as  a  monopolist’s  mechanism  for  extracting  
surplus  from  consumers”);;  Gregory  S.  Crawford,  The Discriminatory Incentives to
Bundle in the Cable Television Industry, 6 QUANTITATIVE MARKETING ECON. 41, 50–51
(2008); Gregory S. Crawford & Joseph Cullen, Bundling, Product Choice, and
Efficiency: Should Cable Television Networks be Offered à la Carte?, 19 INFO. ECON. &
POL’Y 379, 380 (2007) (“bundling  can  be  used  by  firms  to  price  discriminate  among  
consumers or to extend market power  into  related  product  markets”);; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-8, Issues Related to Competition and Subscriber Rates in
the Cable Television Industry i  (2003)  (“technological, economic, and contractual factors
explain the practice of grouping networks into tiers, thereby limiting the flexibility that
subscribers have to choose only the networks that they want to receive”);;  David
Waterman, Ryland Sherman, & Sung Wook Ji, The Economics of Online Television:
Industry Development, Aggregation, and “TV  Everywhere,” 37 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 725,
728 (2013) (suggesting that brand development is an important motive for bundling).
4
See Brewster, supra note 1, at 23–24.
5
See Christopher T. Buckley, Note, À La Carte v. Channel Bundling: The Debate over
Video Programming Distribution, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 413, 414 (2008).
6
See Brewster, supra note 1, at 35–36; Waterman et al., supra note 3, at 727 & fig.2
(2013) (noting services that offer disaggregated content on a subscription and advertising
business model). Some services, like the Amazon Prime video service, combine a
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consumers are much closer to paying only for TV that they want than they
have been since cable began to compete with free broadcast television.
Schooling also need not work on a bundled model. Students, especially
older students, could secure different services from different providers:
math from one, literature from another, football coaching from a third.
This   kind   of   “unbundling,”   which   has   long   existed   at   the   margins   of  
schooling, is poised to enter the mainstream.
Although not as
straightforwardly as in the television industry, unbundling will be
dramatically facilitated by the infrastructure of information technology.
Online education, as its technological sophistication increases, makes it
increasingly possible and practical to pick and choose.7 As it did for
television, this portends drastic changes in the educational marketplace.
New kinds of service providers, both governmental and private, will arise.
Established players will face new kinds of competition.
It is natural to object that, from the point of view both of law and
policy, TV and school are completely different. Television and school are
both culturally very important and we, as a nation, spend a lot of time with
both.    Nevertheless,  the  state  doesn’t  care  enormously  much  what  kind  of  
TV you watch, or even whether you watch at all. Its regulation of the
television market focuses primarily on pricing and access. 8 In contrast,
the state compels children to go to school, and pervasively regulates what
they learn and experience there. Government, in closely regulating
schools, seeks to advance all sorts of goals. 9 Schools ensure the continuity
packaged set of free shows for a flat fee plus à la carte access to a much wider variety of
products. See Michael L. Wayne, Netflix, Amazon, and Branded Television Content in
Subscription Video On-Demand Portals, 40 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC. 725, 731 (2018).
7
See Heather Staker & Michael B. Horn, Blended Learning in the K–12 Education
Sector, in 2 BLENDED LEARNING: RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 287, 294–95 (Anthony G.
Picciano, Charles D. Dziuban & Charles R. Graham eds., 2014).
8
See Nodir Adilov, Bundling Information Goods Under Endogenous Quality Choice, 24
J. MEDIA ECON. 6, 7 (2011).
9
See William A. Galston, The Politics of Polarization: Education Debates in the United
States, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 57, 59 (Susan Fuhrman & Marvin Lazerson eds., 2005)
(claiming  that  there  is  “agreement  at  the  most  general  level  about  the  purposes  of  K–12
education”  and  listing  them  as  the  transmission  of  “basic  knowledge  and  skills”  and  
preparing  children  for  further  education,  “social  life,”  and  “democratic  citizenship,”  and  
“imparting  to  students  a  love  of  knowledge,  learning,  and  artistic  excellence.”);;  AMY
GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 49  (1987)  (emphasizing  the  formation  of  “the  
moral character  of  citizens”  as  a  key  goal  of  schooling);;  TRACY L. STEFFES, SCHOOL,
SOCIETY, AND STATE: A NEW EDUCATION TO GOVERN MODERN AMERICA, 1890–1940,
at 4–5, 11 (arguing that public schools were the preeminent public institution of social
policy  in  the  early  twentieth  century,  and  further  describing  the  public  school  as  “an  
important  site  of  state  formation  …  where  public  power  and  individual rights were
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of our political, economic, and social systems. They train the labor force.
They prepare children to be effective citizens. They express our civic
ideals, and provide a site where we as a polity work out many of our most
basic civic conflicts. They are the preeminent institution implementing
social policy regarding children. They lay the groundwork for lifelong
learning. And, for very large numbers of children and their families, they
provide a crucial social community, as well as an academic one. 10
None of that, though, obviates pressure from the consuming public to
unbundle. Schools in this respect are very much like cable companies.
They might prefer to hold onto the bundled model; they might even have
good reasons.11 Nevertheless they will increasingly feel the need to let go
of that preference as a sufficient number of consumers recognize that
technology  makes  it  possible  for  them  no  longer  to  buy  things  they  don’t  
want.12 In the case of cable, that pressure was exerted substantially
through market signals, as many customers cut the cable cord (or chose
not to tie it to begin with). In the case of schools, which are primarily
provided by governments, the ratio of regulatory and political pressures to
market ones will likely be larger, even much larger. Nonetheless, the
school system is likely to feel with increasing urgency the need to serve
customers who are looking to cut the metaphorical, educational cord.
Families operating in an unbundled educational marketplace are, by
definition,  engaging   in  educational   “choice.”    The  essence  of  unbundling  
is to facilitate consumer choice among discrete elements, rather than
having pre-set packages of services handed to them. But unbundling is a
genus of choice different from the classic choice among schools. It casts
families, at least potentially, as the assemblers of bespoke educational
packages for their children, responsive at once to their own particular
needs and desires, to what is available in the marketplace, and to the
regulatory environment. Such choice has the potential to be more
efficient, more broad-based, more diverse, more destructive to a common

negotiated”).  
10
See PETER BLATCHFORD, ANTHONY D. PELLEGRINI, & ED BAINES, THE CHILD AT
SCHOOL: INTERACTIONS WITH PEERS AND TEACHERS 18  (2d  ed.  2016)  (“[S]chool  is  
where children in the industrialized world learn to interact and form relationships with
others.”);;  Aaron  J.  Saiger,  The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495,
519, 526 (2010).
11
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
12
See Michael A. Salinger, A Graphical Analysis of Bundling, 68 J. BUS. 85, 86 (1995)
(bundling  “is only practical if there is some way to prevent people from buying both
components separately”).
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civic culture, and more transformative of the education sector than school
choice as currently understood.13
For the state, the question will be how best to adapt law and regulation
to the unbundled context while preserving its policy and regulatory goals
with respect to schooling—and, it is to be hoped, while still realizing some
of the welfare improvements that unbundling offers. The purpose of this
brief, exploratory Essay is to begin to imagine the scope of such a project
and some of the directions states might take in enacting it. The Essay
argues for two primary propositions. First, state regulation of schools
consistently intertwines the regulation of delivery of educational goods
and the regulation of their assembly. Unbundling requires regulators to
disaggregate these enterprises. Second, unbundling will change the role of
existing institutions and give birth to new varieties of players in the
schooling marketplace. Regulation needs to account for these changed
and  new  institutions’  likely  forms,  capacities,  and  incentives.
Dimensions of Educational Bundling and Unbundling
Educational unbundling remains a nascent trend, and one being shaped
by technology that is changing very quickly. It is therefore impossible to
specify exactly what an unbundled educational system might look like or
how it might operate. But some critical, if preliminary, observations are
possible.
13

Considered from the perspective of consumers, the straightforward economic intuition
is that bundling will increase the distributive efficiency of the market for education. The
argument tracks that for traditional school choice. Allowing parents to choose schools
increases the total consumer utility in the system, restoring to consumers the surplus
otherwise lost to monopolist, government providers. See Julian R. Betts, The Economic
Theory of School Choice, in GETTING CHOICE RIGHT: ENSURING EQUITY AND
EFFICIENCY IN EDUCATION POLICY 14, 16–22 (Julian R. Betts & Tom Loveless eds.,
2005). Likewise, unbundled assembly would improve upon traditional choice at the
school level, by restoring to consumers the surplus otherwise lost to the school-level
bundler when the consumer pays for educational components (even at her optimal school)
that she does not want. Put differently, bundling makes practical the creation of many
more  assemblages  of  educational  goods  (“schools”)  than  traditional  school  choice.    
Bundling thus more closely approaches the welfare effects of perfect competition than
ordinary school choice. At the same time, however, under some circumstances bundling
permits the production of more, more diverse, and higher quality goods that those that
would be produced in a fully unbundled marketplace. See generally Brown & Alexander,
supra note 3. The net effects of bundling on efficiency therefore require empirical
inquiry. They are unknowable at a moment when unbundling is only beginning to
penetrate the education sector. See id.
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One might productively distinguish between a bundle—a group of
items which must be consumed (or at least purchased) together—and a
menu, a set of items from which a consumer may choose. Like bundles,
menus restrict choice; most things are, so to speak, not on the menu. And
the restrictions imposed by a menu, like those of a bundle, are decided by
suppliers, rather than customers—although in both cases consumer
demand  is  a  factor  in  suppliers’  decisions.    But  menus  are decidedly more
friendly to demand-side preferences than bundles. If a menu item has no
takers, it will not be purchased or consumed. In the educational context,
when a set of goods is unbundled, it is often transformed into a menu. The
unbundling trend I describe moves schooling away from bundles and
towards menus.
Today, primary and secondary schools remain more bundle than menu.
Indeed, schools are ubiquitous bundlers. Schools determine that certain
courses or subjects will be taken together, and that other subjects will be
taught in a particular sequence.14 Schools choose teachers from a universe
of teachers available, but generally tell students which subset of teachers
they will get. Likewise, schools select curricula from a wide variety of
those available, or create their own—and again impose their selections
upon students. And schools make the plethora of educational decisions
involved in combining such elements, everything from scheduling to the
availability of materials. These are bundling decisions.
Individual teachers also ubiquitously bundle. They develop their
lessons by relying on a variety of materials available to them. On any
given day and at any given lesson, a teacher deploys some of his
knowledge, experiences, and techniques, but not others. 15
Schools also set some menus. Middle and high schools have elective
classes and permit students to choose among them. 16 The school
14

See WILLIAM J. REESE, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL 105 (1995)
(“The  earliest  high  school  advocates  had  championed  a  sequenced,  textbook-oriented
course  of  study.”);;  ARTHUR G. POWELL, ELEANOR FARRAR, & DAVID K. COHEN, THE
SHOPPING MALL HIGH SCHOOL: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE EDUCATIONAL
MARKETPLACE (1985)  (referring  to  such  bundling  as  the  “vertical  curriculum”).
15
See D. Jean Clandinin & F. Michael Connelly, Teacher as Curriculum Maker, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CURRICULUM 363, 385ff. (Philip W. Jackson ed., 1992).
16
POWELL, FARRAR, & COHEN, supra note 14, at 12–13  (describing  “shopping-mall,”  
“consumption  oriented”  middle  and  high  schools  where  “the  wish  to  maximize  variety  is  
clear”).    The  contemporary period has seen substantial variability in the views of
education policymakers regarding how to balance sequential, vertical curricula in
required subjects with menus of elective offerings. See RICHARD NEUMANN, SIXTIES
LEGACY: A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS MOVEMENT, 1967–2001, at
197 (2003); Richard Elmore & Gary Sykes, Curriculum Policy, in HANDBOOK OF
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extracurriculum is menu, not bundle. 17 Tracking is sometimes a form of
educational menu to the extent that children and their families control their
placement.18 Even then, however, once a track is chosen it operates as a
bundle of educational experiences that students must consume as a set.
Looking upward from the school, educational authorities at the district
and state levels do several things that clearly constitute menu setting. For
example, they stock school libraries. 19 State chartering authorities also
create a menu when they permit, facilitate, or fund some charter schools
but not others.20
More generally, the ways in which district and state level educational
governments group schools together creates both bundles and menus. The
chartering of charter schools is menu-creation in its purest form. Policies
that define sets of schools as portfolios among which parents may choose,
such as intra-district school choice, are also menus. 21 Sometimes such
menus are created by recasting existing bundles as portfolios of choice. 22
Other groupings of schools, especially at the district level, are not
menus but bundles. The traditional school district practice of maintaining
separate elementary, middle, and high schools creates a bundle of schools
through which students are expected to pass sequentially. In larger
districts, which have multiple elementary, middle, and high schools, the

RESEARCH ON CURRICULUM, supra note 15, at 185, 202.
17
See Laura Berk, The Extracurriculum, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CURRICULUM,
supra note 15, at 1002, 1002.  (“[P]articipation  is  voluntary  rather  than  required, leading
the extracurricular program to be a domain of schooling that is especially responsive to
individual  differences  in  student  interests  and  abilities”).
18
Choices among tracks preceded discrete course electives in American secondary
schooling. See DIANE RAVITCH, LEFT BACK: A CENTURY OF FAILED SCHOOL REFORMS
55 (2000).
19
See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 862,
870  (1982)  (“library books …  by their nature are optional rather than required reading”)  
(emphasis omitted).
20
See Stephen D. Sugarman & Emlei M. Kuboyama, Approving Charter Schools: The
Gate-Keeper Function, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 869, 893–95 (2001).
21
See Atila  Abdulkadiroğlu,  Parag  A.  Pathak,  &  Alvin  E.  Roth,  The New York City High
School Match, 95 AMER. ECON. REV. 364, 364–65 (2005) (citywide high school choice in
New York City); Dana Goldstein, In San Francisco, A Hard Lesson on Integration, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2019, at A1 (discussing implementation of district-wide choice in San
Francisco); Kevin Hesla, Unified Enrollment: Lessons Learned from Across the Country
2  (Nat’l  Alliance  for  Public  Charter  Schools  2018)  (describing  six  cities  that  offer  parents  
“unified  enrollment  system[s]”  that  “have  a  common  website,  a  common  application,  and  
a common  deadline  for  all  public  school  options  within  the  system”).
22
See sources cited supra note 21.
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practice of distributing students among these schools using attendance
zones or some other non-choice-based admissions policy is bundling. 23
Perhaps most importantly, every state maintains a system of school
districts. The set of districts is a menu, but each individual district is a
bundle. A school district is chosen by families, albeit most often through
the operation of the peculiar American institution, mediating choice of
school by choice of residence. 24 Although many families do not
experience the set of school districts as a menu, it is one. The chosen
district, however, is in most cases a bundle, unless it permits itself to
function as a menu.
There are also cases that resist categorization. Whether textbooks25 are
more bundle or more menu depends upon the regime in which they are
produced and used. Textbook authors clearly choose what to put in and
what to leave out.26 But if jurisdictions permit teachers to choose which
parts of textbooks to assign, omit, and emphasize, then teachers create
bundles from the menus that textbook authors define. 27 If jurisdictions
require teachers to follow the textbook with minimal deviation, however,
then the books are themselves bundles. 28
Some textbooks and other learning materials are designed explicitly as
“modular,”   anticipating   teacher   and   student   choice   within   the   menu   they  
set out.29 In other cases, even when teachers are formally permitted
discretion regarding whether to use or omit sections of books, rules
regarding what teachers must cover interact with given textbooks to render
23

See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 8 (1971) (describing
the manipulation of attendance zones based upon residence to achieve racial balance in
student populations).
24
See Saiger, supra note 10, at 500. Cf. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992)
(“Residential  housing  choices,  and  their  attendant  effects  on  the  racial  composition of
schools, present an ever-changing pattern, one difficult to address through judicial
remedies”).  
25
“Textbooks”  in  this  context  include  all  sorts  of  commercial  and  noncommercial  
instructional materials, on paper and online.
26
See, e.g., Smith v.  Bd.  of  Sch.  Comm’rs  of  Mobile  Cty.,  827  F.2d  684,  693  (11th  Cir.  
1987)  (noting  that  history  textbooks  perforce  involve  the  “omission  of  certain  historical  
facts”);;  Jay  D.  Wexler,  Darwin, Design, and Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution
Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L. REV. 751, 752 (2003) (collecting cases and
legislation  involving  textbooks’  presentation  of  evolutionary  and  theistic  approaches  to  
the origin of human beings).
27
See Krishna Kumar, Textbooks and Educational Culture, 21 ECON. & POL. WKLY.
1309, 1309, 1311 (1986).
28
See id.
29
See Barbara Goldschmid & Marcel L. Goldschmid, Modular Instruction in Higher
Education: A Review, 2 HIGHER EDUC. 15, 16 (1973).
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teacher choice largely illusory.30 This is mitigated in states that set limited
menus of textbooks from which schools and teachers can choose.31 Again,
however, such menus may ultimately offer minimal substantive choice. 32
At the same time, regardless of formal policy concerning textbooks, all
teachers enjoy some level of residual discretion when using textbooks;
some bundling decisions are theirs alone. 33
Bundling, menu-setting, and unbundling, in short, are all ubiquitous at
every level of schooling. Nevertheless, bundling at the level of the
individual school is a uniquely important phenomenon. A school bundle
defines the educational experience of any given student at any given time.
All the other aggregative and disaggregative activity in the educational
system is secondary to the assignment of a student to a school. The
bundle that is a school is, in our system, the primary, discrete unit of
educational provision. We (often) give schools proper names. 34 Nosy
grandparents or new neighbors ask kids where they go to school, whether
they like a new school, when they might change schools. The school is

30

See Nicholas C. Polos, Textbooks:    What’s  Wrong  with  Them?, 38 CLEARING HOUSE: J.
EDUC. STRATEGIES, ISSUES AND IDEAS 451,  451  (1964)  (“For  many  years  …  [t]he  
textbook  was  ‘king,’  and,  with  its  tyrannical  narrowness,  was  too  often  the  procrustean  
grave  of  learning.”).  
31
See M. David Bieber, Comment, Textbook Adoption Laws, Precensorship, and the
First Amendment: The Case Against Statewide Selection of Classroom Materials, 17 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 167, 168 & nn.9–10 (1984) (cataloguing rules for textbook adoption
by state); Rebecca Tanglen, Comment, Local Decisions, National Impact: Why the Public
School Textbook Selection Process Should Be Viewpoint Neutral, 78 U. COLO. L. REV.
1017, 1019–20 (2007). Even if textbook choice is formally available, moreover, school
budgets often have no room for new book purchases.
32
See, e.g., Stephen P. Ruis, Something’s Wrong with Chemistry Textbooks, 65 J.
CHEMICAL EDUC. 720, 721 (1988) (“narrowness”  in  curricular  preferences  results  in  there  
being  “little  if  any  difference  between  textbooks  for  a  given  course”).
33
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971) (“[T]eachers  have  a  substantially  
different ideological character from books [and][i]n terms of potential for involving some
aspect of faith or morals in secular subjects, a textbook’s content is ascertainable, but a
teacher’s handling of a subject  is  not”).
34
See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 24 (2018); Derek H. Alderman, School Names as Cultural Arenas: The
Naming of US Public Schools after Martin Luther King, Jr., 23 URB. GEOGRAPHY 60,
605–06 (2002); Peter W. Moran, What’s  in  a  Name:  Issues  of  Race,  Gender,  Culture,  and  
Power in the Naming of Public School Buildings in Kansas City, Missouri, 1940–1995,
35 PLANNING AND CHANGING 129 (2004). Cf. Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights
and the First  Amendment’s  Perfect  Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 1, 7–9 (2007) (cataloguing
instances of the sale of naming rights to facilities within public schools, especially
athletic facilities, to private parties).
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the   child’s   most   important   social   world. 35 It is for this reason that the
primary arena for school choice is choice among schools. Approaches to
unbundling that undermine the school as the central bundled unit of
educational provision, and instead permit the assembly of educational
components from menus, therefore deserve particular attention.
Bundling, unbundling, and the setting of menus also look very different
depending on the developmental stage of pupils, the subject matter at
issue, and various species of communities. The age of students is
obviously quite important. Middle and high schools where students move
from course to course are more straightforwardly unbundled than primary
school classrooms whose single teacher who moves seamlessly from
subject to subject. Children with the ability to engage in self-direction and
to move from task to task independently or with minimal supervision—
generally older children—can consume unbundled education more easily
than those who cannot. Students whose learning emphasizes informal
education through play, social interaction, and similar modalities are less
easy subjects for unbundling than those whose instruction is formal and
discrete. This group primarily consists of younger children, but also
includes  many  special  education  students.    The  special  education  sector’s  
focus upon the mainstreaming of students, which is demanded by the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 36 poses particular challenges
to unbundling, because unbundling challenges the premise that there exists
a  primary   “stream”   into  which  special  education   students  can  and   should  
be integrated.
The feasibility of unbundling also depends on the content being taught.
Under current and immediately foreseeable technological conditions,
where one imagines that the market for unbundled services will be
substantially online, unbundling appears likely to be much more
straightforward for some curricular areas than others. At least until virtual
reality technology matures, subjects where instruction is accomplished
almost exclusively through seeing, hearing, talking, and writing will adapt
to an unbundled marketplace much more readily than those that require
hands-on activities, in-person interaction, or substantial capital
expenditure. The former can aggregate students regardless of residence,
and the students can do a substantial part of their work asynchronously.
The latter require students to be in the same place at the same time and
therefore to live near one another.
35
36

See sources cited supra note 10.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2012).
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In the first category are mathematics, literature, and history. In the
second are the arts (visual, musical, and dramatic). Laboratory sciences
are also in the second category to the extent that they are in fact taught
using hands-on exercises, in labs with special equipment; such practices in
many schools are more aspirational than real, however. Team sports also
belong in this second category. Physical education, however, has been
very successful as an unbundled, online academic offering as exercise can
be a solitary pursuit and does not necessarily require specialized
equipment.37 Unbundling also applies more easily to the extracurriculum
and   the   academic   curriculum   than   to   the   social   services   that   today’s  
schools provide, and to moral and ethical education that is conveyed more
by example and atmosphere than by direct instruction. This issue will be
developed infra.
Population density is also a critical feature that shapes the nature of
unbundling. The denser the immediate area, the more choice a
marketplace can generate. Density makes it possible for a market to
develop with respect to educational activities that require colocation,
synchronicity, and physical capital; and it enriches the market for all
activities by allowing variations that include these features. Geographic
density, however, is relevant only insofar as the services in question are
live. For online menus, density becomes irrelevant, except to the extent
that areas with cheap and ubiquitous broadband can unbundle more easily
than those that lack these features.
Legislation and Litigation Regarding Bundling and Unbundling
The unbundling of school is not unknown to American law. The
concept has cropped up over time in various ways. In the case reports and
the statute books, the clearest cases are those involving families that seek
to opt in to, or opt out of, portions of a full public school program. A child
who is home schooled or attends a private school might seek to participate
in   some   part   of   the   public   school’s   curriculum,   or   its   extracurricular  
activities. These are opt-in requests. Conversely, public-school parents
sometimes seek to withdraw their children from portions of school
programs without withdrawing them entirely from school. These are optout requests. Public authorities often resist both kinds of requests, on the
grounds that public school is a package deal, not a cafeteria where one
37

Sarah Gonzalez, How Students Take Physical Education Online, STATEIMPACT
FLORIDA (Aug. 28, 2012, 1:07 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/florida/2012/08/28/howstudents-take-physical-education-online.
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may pick and choose. When officials make such arguments, they are
claiming that public school is a bundle, not a menu.
These disputes have generated not only case law and state legislation
but also a secondary literature that is both positive and normative. 38 I will
not recapitulate that literature here. The upshot of the positive research is
that courts are quite unfriendly to selective enrollment, often taking the
view that that public school is an all-or-nothing proposition.39
Legislatures and educational regulators have been substantially less
negative. 40 Regardless, for my purposes here what is important is the
arguments of the parties and the different ways those arguments frame
unbundling.
Recall some paradigmatic opt-in situations. Children who wish to
pursue the bulk of their education at home, or at least outside of the public
schools, nevertheless seek to participate in components of the local public
school’s  curriculum  or  extracurriculum.    They  do so usually because these
endeavors require specialized equipment, specialized pedagogical

38

See, e.g., Joshua Roberts, Dispelling the Rational Basis for Homeschooler Exclusion
from High School Interscholastic Athletics, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 195 (2009); John T. Plecnik,
Equal Access to Public Education: An Examination of the State Constitutional &
Statutory Rights of Nonpublic Students to Participate in Public School Programs on A
Part-Time Basis in North Carolina & Across the Nation, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 3
(2007) (focusing on North Carolina law); William Grob, Access Denied: Prohibiting
Homeschooled Students from Participating in Public-School Athletics and Activities, 16
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 823 (2000); Jeff Prather, Part-Time Public School Attendance and the
Freedom  of  Religion:  Yoder’s  Impact  Upon  Swanson, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 553 (2000); David
W. Fuller, Public School Access: The Constitutional Right of Home-Schoolers  to  “Opt  
In”  to  Public  Education  on  a  Part-Time Basis, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1998); Eugene C.
Bjorklun, Home Schooled Students: Access to Public School Extracurricular Activities,
109 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1996); Lisa M. Lukasik, Comment, The Latest Home Education
Challenge: The Relationship Between Home Schools and Public Schools, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 1913 (1996).
39
See Kevin Rogers & Richard Fossey, Same-Sex Marriage and the Public School
Curriculum: Can Parents Opt Their Children out of Curriculum Discussions about
Sexual Orientation and Same-Sex Marriage?, BYU EDUC. & L.J. 423, 425–37 (2011)
(reviewing caselaw across subjects that have stimulated opt-out requests).
40
See id. at 438–59; Matthew Lashof-Sullivan, Sex Education in Schools, 16 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 263, 266 (2015) (nearly all states permit parents to withdraw students from
sex education in public schools); Christina Sim Keddie, Homeschoolers and Public
School Facilities: Proposals for Providing Fairer Access, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 603, 617–19 & nn.72–97  (2007)  (cataloguing  state  statutes,  which  “ru[n] the
gamut from merely allowing homeschooler participation in interscholastic sports, to
mandating access to classes, school facilities, and extracurricular and interscholastic
activities”).
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expertise, and/or a large group of participants. 41 Families’  arguments  that  
public schools must accede to such requests are straightforward. They
begin with their uncontested legal right to enjoy the entirety of a public
school program. Therefore, they argue, they are surely entitled to avail
themselves of only some of the public school curriculum. This argument
seems uncontroversial when translated to other public services. 42 In a
jurisdiction that provides public garbage pickup, a resident who withholds
some of her garbage for a backyard compost heap does not lose the right
to have the city pick up the rest. 43 Public parks are open to all, including
patrons of private gymnasia or health clubs—even though one might
engage in identical activities in the private gym as in the public park. 44
In the case of education services, the argument, in some respects, is
especially compelling. Families that seek opt-out remind us that the
choice to forgo public schooling in favor of private instruction is a
constitutional   right,  one   that   reflects   the   nation’s   “fundamental   theory   of  
liberty”   that   “excludes   any   general   power   of   the   state   to   standardize   its  
children.”45 Homeschooling in particular is a choice that most states
protect by statute.46 To deny students access to services to which they
would otherwise be entitled on account of a choice that is legally and
constitutionally protected is not only perverse but, in the latter case, an
unconstitutional condition.
Families seeking to opt in also have strong policy arguments. They pay
their taxes and their children are residents like any other. States,
41

See, e.g., Bradstreet v. Sobol, 225 A.D.2d 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (home-schooled
student seeks to participate in interscholastic sports; school rejects eligibility; court
affirms). The case in this and the subsequent note are collected and analyzed in Ralph D.
Mawdsley, Parental Rights and Home Schooling: Current Home School Litigation, 135
WEST EDUC. REPT. 313, 317–19 (1999).
42
See Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 DENV. U.L. REV. 1185,
1214–15 (1996) (private purchase of additional quanta of services provided at a baseline
level by government is compatible with legal requirements that government provide
equal services to all).
43
Cf. Alexandra I. Evans & Robin M. Nagele, A Lot to Digest: Advancing Food Waste
Policy in the United States, 58 NAT. RESOURCES J. 177, 194 (2018) (noting policy in
some jurisdictions of subsidizing residents who engage in private composting).
44
See Gillette, supra note 42, at 1995, 1209–10. Cf. Lauren C. Abercrombie, et al.,
Income and Racial Disparities in Access to Public Parks and Private Recreation
Facilities, 34 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 9, 10 (2008) (distinguishing  between  “access  to  
free-for-use  facilities,  such  as  public  parks,”  and  “pay-for-use facilities such as health
clubs and dance studios”).
45
Pierce  v.  Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
46
See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 124 (2008).
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moreover, offer free public schooling to all children for many reasons: to
ensure an educated populace, to train good citizens, to be confident that
future voters will competently exercise their right to vote and future jurors
their duty to serve, to promote equity, fairness, and diversity. 47 All of
these goals are furthered when more children participate in some fashion
in public school programs, and are compromised by a policy that entirely
excludes children willing to participate in part.
While families seek to opt in to public schools for all sorts of reasons,
families who want to withdraw their children piecemeal from the public
school program are less varied. Requests to opt out are typically
motivated by religious objections to sex education, to teaching about
evolution, and to curriculum regarding sexual preference, gender identity,
and nontraditional family structures.48 The more overt religious cast of
exemption requests has resulted in somewhat different, and less friendly,
judicial treatment than opt-in cases.
Conceptually, however, opt-in and opt-out cases pose the same
problem. They differ only in the magnitude of the fraction of the public
school program that parents seek for their children. For this reason, the
arguments of opt-out families very closely track those of families who
wish   to   opt   in.      Why   should   a   family’s   constitutional right to public
education for their children be subject to their waiver of their
constitutional right to withdraw from education that standardizes their
children?      And   doesn’t   a   no   opt-out policy seek unconstitutionally to
“standardize”  children?    Furthermore, why would the government want to
force objectors from public school altogether, depriving them and society
of the many benefits that come with participation in public schools that is
as wide and diverse as possible?
Opponents of both opt-in and opt-out are committed to the view that
public school programs are unseverable. Although treating schools as
bundles will lead some families to opt out entirely, it will leave others, and
perhaps many more, who choose to accept the whole of the package
offered. This advances whatever policy motivated the creation of the
47

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (parents sue for right to prior
notice and opportunity to withdraw their children from public-school lessons involving
“books that portray diverse families, including families in which both parents are of the
same gender”  until  the  seventh  grade;;  court  denies  relief);;  Leebaert  v.  Harrington,  332  
F.3d  134  (2d  Cir.  2003)  (parents  seek  to  exempt  child  from  “family  life  education  
program”);;  Mary-Michelle Upson Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum:
Is  There  a  Right  to  Have  One’s  Child  Excused  from  Objectionable  Instruction?, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 871, 873–74 & nn.3–7 (1977) (collecting incidents from the mid-1970s).
48
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package in the first instance. Selective enrollment and disenrollment also
undermines  schools’  efforts  to  create  coherent  instructional  programs  and  
learning communities that have disciplinary, pedagogic, and democratic
coherence. Students opting in and out make it impossible to develop and
enforce school rules fairly and easily. They undermine the desirable
interrelatedness and interdependence of curriculum. And civically, public
schools are meant to be educational communities, little democracies that
teach children by example and through participation what it means to live
in community. 49 This has been a basic tenet of the hegemonic, Deweyian
Progressivism of American education for many decades. 50
But
communities are the opposite of cafeterias. To be in community means to
accept compromises and package deals.
These objections are simultaneously logistical and ideological.
Consider, for example, the way a home-schooler’s  request  to opt-in to the
varsity football squad might interact with a school policy requiring
athletes to maintain some minimum academic average. 51 Or consider how
both opting in and opting out might interfere with efforts to teach children
relationships between mathematics and the sciences through course
sequencing and coordinated instruction. 52 These are quite practical
problems.
But they are not exclusively practical. Granting such requests disrupts
the nature of the community within the public school in its educational,
civic, and social dimensions. If one finds a way to accommodate the
home schooled athlete on a public school football team, that player will be
subject to different rules than his teammates who are enrolled in the full
curricular and co-curricular program of the public school. How would
such students react, and how would they be entitled to react, to such
disparities? To what extent is the opting-in student part of the team?
Likewise, physics classes designed to interlock with a parallel math
class would need to change in practical ways if some students could enroll
in one without the other. But such changes would also signal a change in
the community of learners that the developers of an interlocking STEM
program might have sought to create. A fortiori, opting out of
49

Cf. Gillette, supra note 42, at 1213–16 (elaborating this argument with respect to
public goods generally, including but not limited to schooling).
50
See Saiger, supra note 10, at 522.
51
See Roberts, supra note 38, at 198–199.
52
See, e.g., Douglas B. Larkin, Putting Physics First: Three Case Studies of High School
Science Department and Course Sequence Reorganization, 116 SCH. SCI. &
MATHEMATICS 225, 232–33 (2016).
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controversial pedagogy, especially with respect to sex and to diversity on
any number of dimensions, could very substantially undermine
community-building efforts designed for a school community whose
membership is full-time and stable.
Unbundling is Pervasive
These arguments, on both sides of the selective enrollment debate,
appear  in  an  entirely  different  light  when  one  leaves  the  frame  of  “school.”    
Once one considers the informal education sector, educational unbundling
reveals itself to be everywhere.
In its ubiquity, it is largely
uncontroversial.
Public-school parents unbundle every time they supplement their
child’s   schooling   with   after-school   “lessons”   in   things   like   karate,   ballet,  
or piano.
It seems entirely normal, in middle- and upper-class
communities, to buy these services on private markets and consume them
during non-school time.53 Such behavior might be seen as a symptom or
even a cause of systematic social and economic inequity in society, but as
a matter of day-to-day practice it raises few objections. 54 Parents
unbundle services like these, moreover, notwithstanding that physical
education and fine arts are part of the academic program of many
schools.55 The level and intensity of such programs are insufficient to
meet   many   families’   desires. Therefore, such families supplement, even
as they continue to get most of their educational services from their
school.

53

See Douglas Kleiber & Gwynn M. Powell, Historical Change in Leisure Activities
During After-School Hours, in ORGANIZED ACTIVITIES AS CONTEXTS OF DEVELOPMENT:
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES, AFTER-SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY PROGRAMS 23, 36
(Joseph L. Mahoney, Reed W. Larson, & Jacquelynne S. Eccles eds., 2005).
54
In order to mitigate this problem, many advocate for public agencies other than schools
to fund after-school programming for youth. Karen Pittman, Joel Tolman, & Nicole
Yohalem, Developing a Comprehensive Agenda for Out-of-School Hours: Lessons and
Challenges Across Cities, in ORGANIZED ACTIVITIES AS CONTEXTS OF DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 53, at 375, 377. This is a public form of unbundling.
55
See National Endowment for the Arts, A Decade of Arts Engagement: Findings from
the Survey of Public Participation in the Arts, 2002–2012, at 64 (2015) (reporting that,
with the exception of dance, most arts instruction occurs inside of school, but that a
substantial amount of arts instruction is informal; however, these data do not differentiate
programs for school-aged children and informal arts education that targets adults),
https://www.arts.gov/publications/decade-arts-engagement-findings-survey-publicparticipation-arts-2002-2012.
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Somewhat more controversy arises with respect to privately obtained
enrichment and drill in those academic subjects that our culture views as
the core subjects of school curricula. In many places, there is a robust
private market for such supplementation, primarily serving middle- and
upper-income households but also including not insubstantial numbers of
less privileged families. The most pervasive is private preparation
services for college entrance exams. 56 Parallel industries prepare younger
students for high-school entrance exams in jurisdictions that use them. 57
There are also extracurricular academies, modeled upon Japanese and
Korean   “cram   schools”   or   similar   to   them,   that   provide   academic  
supplementation without targeting a particular standardized test.58
Providers of these services find customers for the same reason that
piano teachers and karate schools do: Although the subjects are taught in
school, for some families they are not taught well enough, intensely
enough, or in the appropriate fashion. The result is a so-called   “shadow  
education   system,”   targeted   at   public   school   students   but   independent   of  
public schools and run in parallel to them. 59
The shadow system finds many critics, who view it as an engine of
educational inequality. 60 These concerns are serious. Only families able
and willing to pay can avail themselves of such instruction. But it is
impossible to imagine a legal argument to support prohibiting the purchase
of such supplementary, unbundled services. The Supreme Court has
specifically voided state restrictions on parental efforts to secure
56

See Alice Yin, Asian Test-Prep Centers Offer Parents Exactly What They Want:
‘Results,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/magazine/asian-test-prep-centers-offer-parentsexactly-what-they-want-results.html.
57
See id.
58
Jean Park, From Culturally-Driven to Market-Driven Academic Success: Korean
“Cram  Schools”  in  the  New  York  Metropolitan  Area, GOTHAM CENTER FOR NEW YORK
CITY HISTORY BLOG (Aug. 6, 2016), https://www.gothamcenter.org/blog/from-culturallydriven-to-market-driven-academic-success-korean-cram-schools-in-the-new-yorkmetropolitan-area; Kyle Spencer, Centers See New Faces Seeking Test Prep, N.Y. TIMES,
April 2, 2013, https://cn.nytimes.com/education/20130404/c04cram/en-us/. On cram
schools in Asia, and their distributional effects, see Nancy Ukai Russell, Lessons from
Japanese Cram Schools, in THE CHALLENGE OF EASTERN ASIAN EDUCATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICA 153, 153–54, 168–70 (William K. Cummings & Philip G.
Altbach eds., 1997).
59
See Claudia Buchmann, Dennis J. Condron, & Vincent J. Roscigno, Shadow
Education, American Style: Test Preparation, the SAT and College Enrollment, 89
SOCIAL FORCES 435, 438–39 (2010).
60
See id. at 455.
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extracurricular instruction for students, holding   that   the   right   “to   acquire  
useful   knowledge”   is   a   liberty   interest   protected   by   substantive   due  
process.61 Although the state may set a floor for private as well as public
education, it may not interfere in parental efforts to supplement above that
floor, outside of the school day. This seems to be an obviously correct
application   of   the   principle   that   states   may   not   “standardize”   children. 62
The First Amendment also independently protects the provision of such
supplementary schooling.
Unbundling is also institutionalized in pockets of the formal education
sector. Higher education, for example, is unbundled to a much greater
extent than primary and secondary schooling. The higher-education sector
is of course in a category of its own for many important reasons.
Although it includes many public schools, colleges and universities serve
adults and attendance is voluntary. Therefore, less social expectation and
fewer diverse policy goals attach to their activities. But it is important
nevertheless to acknowledge that the standard college and graduate school
model is an unbundled educational menu, at least regarding academics.
The college or university has a provider role, making available a universe
of courses. The student, not the school, selects those courses.63 The
college or university also fulfills a regulatory role, requiring that all
courses take certain forms and that the assembly of courses conform to
particular rules.64 The government in turn relies upon private accreditors
who regulate the  schools’  regulations.65
Primary and secondary schools themselves have also adopted a more
unbundled self-conception. The Individuals with Disabilities Education
61

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Pierce  v.  Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
63
This ubiquitous practice was catalyzed by Harvard President Charles W. Eliot, who
upon assuming the presidency of the College dismantled its standardized, one-size-fits-all
undergraduate curriculum in favor of a system of electives. See Hazen C. Carpenter,
Emerson, Eliot, and the Elective System, 24 NEW ENGLAND Q. 13, 25–26 (1951).
64
See Darrell B. Warner & Katie Koeppel, General Education Requirements: A
Comparative Analysis, 58 J. GENERAL EDUC. 241, 243 (2009). Unbundling has been
much less prevalent with respect to the nonacademic functions of colleges and
universities, especially in upmarket institutions that also house and care for students. See,
e.g., Robert D. Reason & Ellen M. Broido, Philosophies and Values, in STUDENT
SERVICES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PROFESSION 39, 46–47, 49–51 (John H. Schuh, Susan
R. Jones, & Vasti Torres eds., 6th ed. 2016).
65
See generally JUDITH S. EATON, COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION ACCREDITATION,
AN OVERVIEW OF US ACCREDITATION (rev. ed. 2015)
https://www.chea.org/sites/default/files/othercontent/Overview%20of%20US%20Accreditation%202015.pdf.
62
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Act (IDEA) has been a critical force moving them in this direction. One
of the IDEA’s primary requirements is that schools prepare an
“individualized   education   program”   (IEP)   for   each   student   with   a  
disability. 66 The IEP sets out how the school will marshal resources to
meet the individual educational needs of each particular student.67 This
means that each student has their own program particularized by the
school (or, in many cases, negotiated between school officials and the
particular family).68 To require states to provide this sort of bespoke
educational program is to require schools to provide special education in
an unbundled form.
Although   the   legal   obligation   to   provide   “individualized   education”  
applies only to students with disabilities, the institutionalization of
unbundling in the special education context demonstrates its broader
feasibility.    “Differentiated  instruction,”  the  idea  that  schools  should  tailor  
educational  experiences  to  every  student’s  particular  needs, 69 has become
an important pedagogical reform in general as well as special educational
contexts.70 Numerous  teachers’  guides  both  emphasize  the  desirability  of  
differentiation and presents strategies for its implementation. 71
“Differentiated   instruction”   is   the   general-education analogue of the
“individualized  education”  to  which  students  with  disabilities  are  entitled  
under the IDEA. Like the development of IEPs, differentiation is a
species of unbundling. It involves assembling various components
particularistically and differently for each individual. 72
66

20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(18) (2012 & Supp. 2018), 1415(b)(2) (2012).
See id. §§ 1412(a)(4) (2012), 1414(d) (2012); Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education,
Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1421
(2011).
68
See Pasachoff, supra note 67, at 1424.
69
See Pearl Subban, Differentiated Instruction: A Research Basis, 7 INT’L EDUC. J. 935,
940–41 (2006).
70
See, e.g., Timothy J. Landrum & Kimberly A. McDuffie, Learning Styles in the Age of
Differentiated Instruction, 18 EXCEPTIONALITY 6, 14 (2010) (listing, in a specialeducation journal, children with disabilities as one student population among many that
can benefit from differentiated instruction); Subban, supra note 69, at 938 (listing the
“inclusion  of  students  with  disabilities”  among  factors  that  have  given  rise  to  
differentiation in instruction).
71
See, e.g., CAROL ANN TOMLINSON, THE DIFFERENTIATED CLASSROOM: RESPONDING
TO THE NEEDS OF ALL LEARNERS (2d ed. 2014); AMY BENJAMIN, DIFFERENTIATED
INSTRUCTION A GUIDE FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS (2003).
72
There are pedagogical as well as legal differences. Many supporters of differentiation
support it precisely because they see it as a way to preserve the common nature of the
public school program, by insisting that diverse learners can be accommodated in the
context of a single, public school.
67
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Another important sector is religious schooling. To freely purchase
supplementary religious schooling is a component of the constitutionally
guaranteed free exercise of religion. 73 It is also a due process right, just as
the purchase of any other supplementary schooling would be. 74 The
Supreme Court has also established that parents for whom supplemental
religious instruction is insufficient have the right to choose to exit the free
public schools and enroll children in religious private schools. 75 These
principles were established early in the twentieth century. Since then,
most of the legal controversy over extracurricular religious training has
been the extent to which public funds may be used for religious instruction
or by religious educational institutions.
Two observations about bundling emerge from the religious instruction
cases. One is that the Court continues to analyze the Establishment Clause
implications of religious instruction in public schools based upon the
extent to which that instruction is discretely provided, apart from the
regular services of the school. The greater the extent to which some kind
of secular instruction is impermeable to religious concerns, the more
courts are willing to tolerate public funding of such instruction. 76
Regardless whether this concern is expressed in terms of
“entanglement,”   as   it   was   for   many   decades   in   cases   where   funding   is  
fungible or the programmatic boundaries between religious and secular
elements are fluid, public funding in such cases is thought to be more
constitutionally problematic. One might restate this principle as one of
greater reluctance to permit public funding of the secular portion of

73

See Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927) (holding that the right of a
parent  “to  direct  the  education of  his  own  child  without  unreasonable  restrictions”  
prohibits intrusive regulation of supplementary schools that conduct their activities after
the regular school day).
74
See id. at 298–99.
75
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
76
See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 749 (1976); see also
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997) (overruling past precedent and permitting
publicly funded secular teachers to provide discrete services in public schools because
“there is no reason to presume that”  such  a  teacher  “will  depart  from  her  assigned  duties  
and  instructions  and  embark  on  religious  indoctrination”);;  Bd.  of  Ed.  of  Cent.  Sch.  Dist.  
No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968) (permitting provision of secular textbooks to
religious schools because  it  is  implausible  that  such  books  are  “intertwined”  with  “the  
teaching  of  religion”);;  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616–617 (distinguishing, for
Establishment Clause purposes, books with fixed content from teachers whose inclination
to mix religious and secular instruction is difficult to police).
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bundles that combine religious and secular instruction than to fund the
secular portion of menus that do the same.
More important is the regime that has emerged from the cases to
govern private, religious schools. Governing law understands religious
private schools themselves to be bundles. The religious purpose and
content of the bundle is assumed to reach all of its contents. Religious
schools, therefore, must use their own private resources to teach secular
and state-mandated topics like mathematics and chemistry, as well as to
provide religious instruction.77
Treating private religious schools as bundles makes sense if the
components of religious education are unseverable. 78 In an unbundled
marketplace, however, it does not make sense. If schooling is an
assemblage of discrete components, there is no reason to exclude those
who purchase religious components (or those to whom they are provided
philanthropically) from also taking advantage of publicly provided secular
components.
To restrict enrollment in a state-supported online
mathematics course to those not also enrolled in a religious private school
is clearly unlawful. It is flat-out unconstitutional, just as it would be to
restrict public school enrollment to students who do not attend
supplementary Sunday schools. 79
Some educational actors, religious, antireligious, and disinterested, feel
that religious and secular training are and should be interwoven in
religious schools. 80 The religious actors in this group include both
religious providers of education and its consumers. Other actors would
gladly disentangle the secular and religious components of religious
schools’  programs  in  return  for  public  funding  of  the  former;; 81 and plenty
of religious parents would accept such segregation in exchange for the
77

See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious
Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989,  1017  (1991)  (“[I]f a family chooses to integrate a
religious element into primary or secondary schooling, not only must they bear the costs
of the religious education, but they also forfeit all public subsidy for education, including
secular subjects.”);;  Thomas  C.  Berg,  Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New
Constitutional Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 167 (2003).
78
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 641 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The  
school  is  an  organism  living  on  one  budget.”).
79
See McConnell, supra note 77,  at  1017  (“It is as if those who get an abortion were
thereby  excluded  from  Medicaid”).
80
See id. at 1019–20.
81
See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 759 (recognizing that some religious schools are organized
not  to  be  “so  permeated  by  religion  that  the secular side cannot be separated from the
sectarian”).
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savings.82 The unbundling of the educational marketplace leaves room for
both types of religious enterprises. Some religious educators will provide
at private expense, and find customers for, secular training that is
religiously infused. But others will build programs of study that bundle
strictly secular components, which can receive public subsidy, along with
religious ones.
Finally:
The quintessential unbundlers of the contemporary
educational scene are the home schoolers, both religious and secular. 83
Home schooling families assemble an educational program for each of
their children, using materials available to them. They are generally
Catholic with respect with respect to modality, pedagogy, and provider. 84
Thus, they may choose to teach some of their children some subjects at
home. For other subjects—or for the same subject, but other children —
home schooling families band together, instructing children in small
groups.85 Students may move from house to house (more precisely, venue
to venue) as they secure instruction in various subjects; group membership
can be fluid across these many transitions. In both direct and group
instruction, home schoolers access or purchase curricula and materials
feeling no duty or expectation that they will purchase all their materials
from the same supplier.
Likewise, they may acquire specialized
instruction from one of their number or from outsiders, again with no
expectation that all outside provision will come from the same individual
or firm. 86 In still other cases, they deploy online courses and curricula,
again without any expectation that they will have only one provider. 87
Home schoolers are unbundlers in the sense that they reject existing
schools’   packages   of services. Instead they go onto the open market to
secure the services they want, à la carte. They are also unbundlers
because they often deploy a set of providers unconnected one to another.
This is the reason that home schooling is generally treated as a species of

82

See, e.g., Yigal M. Gross, The Yeshiva Day School System — Costs and
Considerations, TIMES OF ISRAEL: THE BLOGS (June 24, 2016, 10:44 AM),
https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-yeshiva-day-school-system-costs-and-considerations/.
83
See Judith G. McMullen, Behind Closed Doors: Should States Regulate
Homeschooling?, 54 S.C. L. REV. 75, 77–78 (2002) (discussing varied estimates of how
many homeschoolers are religiously motivated).
84
See Aislin Davis, Evolution of Homeschooling, 8 DISTANCE LEARNING 29, 32 (2011).
85
See id. at 34.
86
See, e.g., Eric Wearne, A Descriptive Survey of Why Parents Choose Hybrid
Homeschools, 10 J. SCH. CHOICE 364 (2016).
87
See Davis, supra note 84, at 33–34.
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school choice.88 Its practitioners choose it and then choose, cafeteriastyle, the services that they think are best for their children. This is similar
to the way those who choose schools, private or public, select the school
that they believe best suits them from among the available options.
At the same time, home schoolers are bundlers, in the sense that they
stand in the place of schools. In this they resemble schools and school
systems, which bundle educational goods from a variety of sources.
Schools and home schoolers both choose sets of teachers, develop sets of
curricula, and select sets of textbooks and materials. Unbundled education
moves the assembly function, or at least the right and duty to assemble,
from schools to families.
Limning  the  Unbundled  Education  Space:    Deconstructing  “School”
Identifying home schooling as the fullest contemporary expression of
unbundling signals the basic regulatory move that governments must make
as unbundling becomes more pervasive. Today, the state regulates
“schools,”   both   public   and   private. 89 The schools that are the objects of
that regulation do two things: they provide educational services and they
assemble them. Current law and policy assumes that these two functions
will be performed by the same institution, the school. In an unbundled
world, this assumption is unsustainable. The state will face the job of
disentangling these two arenas of regulation.
The first challenge, and arguably the most jarring, will be to find a
paradigm for the regulation of educational content. The state may (and
should) continue to demand that whatever set of educational components
is chosen for any given student meets certain requirements. Such
regulation is justified by the state’s  interest  in  an  educated  public.    But  to  
do so will require a regulatory approach to curriculum entirely different
from the school-based approach of today. It will require the coordinated
regulation of families, who bear the duty of assembly in an unbundled
regime, and of producers of the educational content that those families will
assemble. It will also require more use of regulatory authority over the
public relative to supervisory authority over state employees.
88

E.g., Clive R. Belfield, Perspectives on Homeschooling, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH
521, 521 (Mark Berends ed., 2009) (“Homeschooling  …  is  possibly  
the most revolutionary form of school choice available within the U.S. educational
system.”)  
89
See, e.g., Bd. of Ed. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968)
(noting the scope of permissible regulation of private schools by public authorities).
ON SCHOOL CHOICE
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And content regulation will need to be pedagogically and socially
sound, administrable, and constitutional—three criteria that will often
push against one another. Regulation of unbundled curriculum will
constantly butt up against the expressive and religious rights both of
families and of providers. While the state has the ability to compel speech
in the context of schools, this power is limited.90 And the state may
interfere neither with the publication of materials aimed at
schoolchildren—no matter what their content—nor with children’s  ability  
to access them.
Beyond the regulation of curriculum, the state will also need to regulate
the educational institutions of an unbundled world. First among these will
be providers of educational services, who will create both materials
required to meet curriculum regulations and other materials that are
discretionary with families. Such institutions already exist, but their
numbers will grow and their forms will proliferate. In addition, many new
institutions will surely arise that will offer to help families with their
duties of educational assembly. Both these kinds of institutions will likely
range across the for-profit, not-for-profit, religious, governmental, and
unincorporated sectors. One important question is whether these various
sectors should be regulated differently.
In short, unbundling will require fundamental reconceptualization of
how education is regulated. Current regulatory approaches will not
translate easily or directly to a new unbundled reality.
Regulation of Curriculum
When school is unbundled, every family will bear a legal duty to
assemble an educational program for each child that meets the
requirements of the state. It is in this sense that the unbundled
marketplace makes home schoolers of everyone. The basic question that
drives the regulation of home schooling (and of private schooling too) thus
becomes a basic problem for all of schooling: How directive can the
government be?
One has the sense that the relatively loose regulation of the content of
private school education by most American jurisdictions today, 91 and the
90

Saiger, Deconstitutionalizing Dewey, 13 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 765, 771–72 (2018)
(citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
91
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF INNOVATION AND IMPROVEMENT,
STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS (2009),
www.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/regprivschl/index.html (providing a 50-state survey of
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even more laissez-faire regulation of home schooling,92 is in part a
consequence of the fact that these methods of schooling are dear to
consumers. Private school tuition is often high, and home schooling
requires a substantial expenditure of time as well as treasure. This means
that the home schooling sector is small, and is dominated by highly
motivated families. 93 The private school sector is larger, but remains
limited, which is unsurprising since private school is an expensive
substitute for a good universally available free of charge. 94 Under current
conditions, therefore, government can meet most of its regulatory goals for
education by pervasively regulating public schools, which are cheap and
popular. It can afford to regulate costly private schools less rigorously,
and treat home schoolers with benign neglect.
That will not be so if everyone unbundles. Government will therefore
be inclined to demand more of assemblers than it does of home schoolers
today. Some new equilibrium will need to be achieved between legitimate
exercise of the police power   to   further   states’   interest   in   an   educated  
populace, and the freedom of individuals and families. 95
At the constitutional level, the resulting disputes are likely to look like
those from the 1920s over the scope of state regulation of private schools.
The three key cases from that era in the United States Supreme Court —
Meyer v. Nebraska,96 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,97 and Farrington v.
Tokushige98 jointly establish that compulsory education is constitutional; 99
that parents have a right to refuse public education and secure private
education instead; that the state may regulate private schools for public
public regulation of private schools); EdChoice, Private Schools and School Choice
Programs Are Regulated, Too, https://www.edchoice.org/school-choice/regulations/
(visited May 8, 2019).
92
See Yuracko, supra note 46, at 129.
93
Home schoolers enrolled 3.4% of all children enrolled in school in 2012. JEREMY
REDFORD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2016-096.REV, HOMESCHOOLING IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2012, at 5 (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016096rev.pdf at page
5
94
Private schools enrolled 10.3% of all children enrolled in school in 2015. NATIONAL
CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, 2016 NCES DIG. EDUC. STAT., at tbl.205.10,
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d16/tables/dt16_205.10.asp?current=yes
95
See E. Vance Randall, Private Schools and State Regulation, 24 Urb. Law. 341, 341–
42 (1992) (describing this as the essential dilemma of private school regulation).
96
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
97
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
98
273 U.S. 284 (1927).
99
The Court subsequently recognized a right to religious exemption from compulsory
schooling, but severely limited its scope. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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purposes; and that regulation of private education may not be so intrusive
that it renders a private school unable to carry out its particular educational
mission.100 On this round, perhaps the outcome will also be the same,
yielding a rule that states can regulate assembly they quite substantially, as
long as they leave room for families to pursue their own idiosyncratic
educational goals. 101 But the particular metes and bounds of this rule will
need to be re-litigated.
At the legislative and bureaucratic level, regulation of assembly will
require a thorough reconsideration of how curriculum regulation should be
specified.      Today’s   regulation   of curriculum is somewhat scattershot.
State legislators often pass general delegations to state departments of
education, and then supplement them with specifications of particular
subjects or activities that may or must be included in curricula. 102 State
departments in turn promulgate a bewildering variety of documents of
varying specificity—frameworks, guidelines, implementation manuals—
that offer little clarity regarding whether or how much legal force they
express.103 A great deal of discretion is left with local districts, school
principals, and individual teachers. This approach can be effective in a
system where the bulk of education occurs in publicly managed schools,
where conflict can be dealt with pursuant to organization charts under
which supervisory authority over teachers lies with the government.104
100

Although the 1920s private-school cases were decided under a pre-West Coast Hotel
understanding of the substantive due process of commercial enterprises, the cases are
universally regarded as still good law. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 393 (1937).
101
See Farrington, 273 U.S. at 298.
102
See STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 91; EdChoice, supra note
91; Clifford Rosky, Anti-Gay Curriculum Laws, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1466 (2017).
103
Consider, as an example, the regulation of the teaching of social studies in New York
State. The New York State Board of Regents formally convened and adopted a
document  entitled  “New  York  State  K–12 Social Studies Framework,”  at  a  regular  
meeting. New York State Educ. Dept., K–12 Social Studies Framework,
http://www.nysed.gov/curriculum-instruction/k-12-social-studies-framework. The
Framework document itself is not stated as a series of legal requirements.    Rather,  it  “is
anchored in the New York State Common Core Standards for Literacy and Writing and
New  York  State  Learning  Standards  for  Social  Studies,”  and  that  it  should  “serve  as  a  
consistent  set  of  expectations  for  what  students  should  learn  and  be  able  to  do.”    
Framework at 2 (rev. Nov. 2014).
104
For example, a school that wishes to substitute a different social studies course for the
standard  prescribed  course  may  do  so  if  the  new  course  is  “equivalent”  to  the  standard.  
“Equivalency is approved by the local public school superintendent or his or her designee
or  by  the  chief  administrative  officer  of  a  registered  nonpublic  high  school.”    New York
State Educ. Dept., K–12 Social Studies Frequently Asked Questions,
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The professional socialization and mores of teachers also constrain
curricular decisions in public schools. The curriculum of private schools
is then regulated, again haphazardly and with great variation across the
states, in terms of the unclear curricular requirements of the public
schools.105
Reliance upon public schools as institutions whose internal working
will yield acceptable curricula will not be possible when regulating
unbundled producers generally. There will be no organization charts, no
constraining professional mores, and no room for vagueness about the
difference between a legal requirement and a statement of pedagogical
preference. Regulations will have to be more specific, less fuzzy, and of a
different character than they are now. In particular, rules that now require,
for example, that students in a given grade have x hours of instruction in
mathematics will need to shift, instead setting out requirements for what
particular subjects must be taught and, perhaps, what kinds of mathematics
instruction needed to be given. 106 This shift will surely accelerate a
critique, already ongoing, of the use of input rather than outcome
measures to describe education. 107
What can the state require of producers of education in the unbundled
marketplace? Such requirements will be substantially constrained by the
First Amendment. Education and expression are inextricably intertwined.
Both individuals and firms have the right to speak to and in front of
children  however  they  like.    A  publisher  can  publish  a  children’s  book  or  a  
textbook that says the Earth is flat, or that it is only six thousand years
old.108 A preacher can tell children that they are saved—or that their
neighbors are damned—even if his message is inimical to the values of
tolerance and community the state wishes to promote. And parents have
both First Amendment and liberty rights to buy the flat-earth book for
http://www.nysed.gov/curriculum-instruction/frequently-asked-questions.
105
See STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 91; EdChoice, supra note
91.
106
See Randall, supra note 95,  at  370  (“Private  school  regulations  are  …  primarily  
programmatic in character and focus on the ingredients that conventional wisdom says
must be present to ensure quality education—items such as instructional time, teacher
certification, teacher/pupil ratio, class size, curriculum, adequate physical facilities,
etc.”).  
107
See id. (“Empirical  research,  however,  reveals  that  there  is  little  if  any  correlation,  let  
alone causal connection, between these  specific  types  of  educational  “inputs”  and  
academic  achievement  or  other  educational  outcomes”);;  Jessica M. Shedd, The History of
the Student Credit Hour, 122 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC. 5, 11 (2003).
108
E.g., EDWARD HENDRIE, THE GREATEST LIE ON EARTH: PROOF THAT OUR WORLD IS
NOT A MOVING GLOBE (2016).
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their children, and take them to hear the preacher. The state cannot
interfere with their doing so.
There remains, however, a regulatory role for the state in helping
consumers understand whether and to what extent given educational
services will help them to satisfy the requirements placed upon assembly.
Consider again the example of a provider who wishes to provide a
mathematics module for use by, say, fifth and sixth grade students.
Anyone can say anything they like about mathematics, and package those
statements for sale. But the government can insist that assemblers find
and use instructional materials that meet state requirements (although they
cannot insist that they use such materials exclusively). The state can
therefore also require providers to state truthfully whether their packages
meet state requirements. A demand that merchants engage in accurate
self-description in an area where such accuracy furthers a crucial state
interest does not violate the First Amendment.109
The primary regulatory challenge in this sphere will be to ensure that
the government does not tread upon free expression in certifying some
kinds of instruction as adequate. In the  current  system,  the  government’s  
right to speak on its own behalf allows it to determine what public schools
say. 110 But in the new system, the government will not be able to
discriminate based upon viewpoint, though it will still be able to require
generally that certain content be taught. The paradigm for regulating all
content providers will therefore be contemporary private school
regulation, which will need to become more rigorous and less vague.
Private schools can be required to meet state-defined subject-matter
requirements with respect to their secular curriculum. They cannot be
required not to provide other lessons. Certification of materials as
compliant with state assembly standards must reflect these principles.
This approach to regulation of production will surely generate daunting
controversies. It would clearly be constitutional to require providers to
disclose whether a state had certified particular materials as meeting
curricular requirements.111 Such   a   case   is   one   where   “the possibility of
deception   is   …   self-evident,”   which   permits   the   government   to   regulate  

109

See Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labeling
Controls and the First Amendment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 63, 76–82 (1995).
110
See Saiger, supra note 90, at 771–72; Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2000).
111
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
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speech in order to protect consumers from false claims. 112 Much more
difficult, however, would be the regulation of claims that some set of
educational materials would be found to, or ought to be found to, meet
assembly requirements. Such assertions might well mix commercial
statements whose truth or falsity should be uncontroversial with other
claims that elicit enormous controversy in areas that are of core public
concern. For example, producers of a flat-earth instructional package, or a
homophobic one, might advertise that it was consistent with an assembly
requirement demanding that students receive instruction regarding certain
topics relating to earth-science and social studies, as defined by some set
of state-approved standards. Governments and other private parties might
vociferously insist that the assertions in such packages, or their general
pedagogic approach, is inconsistent with such standards. Such claims
would present enormously difficult questions regarding whether the
speech involved is commercial or political, what levels of scrutiny are
appropriate, and how such scrutiny should be applied.
Moreover, decisions will need to be made regarding whether
certification rules should apply equally to all providers, or whether forprofit providers should be expected to meet requirements that are not
incumbent upon nonprofits, churches, and families. Current private school
regulation in many states not only treats them differently from public
schools, but treats church schools differently from nonreligious private
schools.113 The political pressure to distinguish these categories with
respect to certification will be considerable.
Regulation of Public Institutions
Although families individually will bear the duty to assemble
educational services for their children, few will have the resources or the
inclination to do so on their own. Most parents, especially those who are
not home schoolers or educators, will look to hire someone to curate the
components. They will be the general contractors of the education sector,
in charge of making sure all of the necessary elements for the project are
in place, subcontracted out, and interacting properly.
The premier third-party bundlers —at least at first—will almost
certainly be public school districts. Perhaps sets of districts, or individual
schools, or states themselves, will fill this role. These institutions will
112
113

Id. at 652.
See STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 91; EdChoice, supra note

91.
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enjoy several advantages. They will be first to the market. They will
engage in both provision and bundling, and therefore will be able to offer
families a ready-made package guaranteed to meet government
requirements. They will also offer the advantages of institutional
schooling, which many families will find congenial: a single community, a
structured day, a place for children to go, a neighborhood-based student
body, teachers and students who are likely to be present for more than a
few months at a time, and so on. The evidence on school choice suggests
that many families are satisfied with their current public schools, and
would therefore be likely to keep them even if alternatives were made
available. 114
At the same time, it seems almost certain that government will begin to
act itself as a provider within the unbundled marketplace: not only will it
provide ready-made assemblies, but it will offer unbundled goods to other
assemblers. This will be especially true of services that are not delivered
in person on school sites. The prototypes for such institutions will be the
state-funded online school districts already operating in several states.115
These not only educate students in-state as part of the public school
system, but offer à la carte services in a nationwide market.
With respect to à la carte provision, government authority will have to
determine what sorts of services it will offer to families, how those
services will be divided into discrete products, and what each product will
contain. This will require many more decisions than those codified by the
state legislature or by the state education department. Such decisions
include those routinely made today by principals, departments, and
individual teachers. These decisions will need to be responsive to market
forces, but government providers will still make them. Such decisions
will be of considerable moment, and it will be necessary to determine
whether and to what extent they will subject to regulation or be left to
institutional discretion. Current statutes governing curriculum116 might
also apply to what states may or may not include in products they offer in
the marketplace.
One of the most concerning of issues with respect to production is how
governments will supply the social services that are now incidental to
114

See Albert Cheng & Paul E. Peterson, How Satisfied Are Parents with Their
Children’s  Schools?,  17 EDUC. NEXT 21, 24 (Spring 2017).
115
E.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§329.840, 338.005 (2012) (creating the Oregon Virtual School
District).
116
See STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS, supra note 91; EdChoice, supra note
91.
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many   public   schools’   programs   but   that   are   still   vital. 117 These depend
upon most students being at a particular public school site on a regular
basis. School lunches and breakfasts feed students who are hungry; 118
how will children be fed, or food insecurity be identified, in an unbundled
system? Teachers and other adults in the school system are mandatory
reporters for child abuse and neglect;119 who must report in an unbundled
world, and how? Public schools conduct health screenings and watch for
drug abuse;120 can unbundled providers do that? Schools operate libraries
for their students; can public libraries take over this function? 121 Schools
provide an opportunity for mainstreamed disabled students to interact with
non-disabled peers, and for mixing of other kinds; how can that be
accomplished?
These problems represent the coming home to roost of the American
decision to put such a large proportion of its social and family services
under the umbrella of the school system. An institutional school could
handle such tasks (though not always easily). If the pressure on schools to
unbundle curriculum crashes that arrangement, substantial investment in
social services outside of school will have to be considered (in the
alternative, one might conclude that the loss of a central venue for
providing these services ought to doom the unbundling project.)
One other service that shares many characteristics with social services
but is distinct from it is discipline. The school that is a miniature society
has what amounts to a miniature law enforcement system. For serious
crimes, it calls in the police and engages societal law enforcement; at the
margins, there are disputes.122 But schools routinely deal with disciplinary
infractions far short of crimes: rudeness, absence, failure to heed
authority, bullying of others. In doing so, they utilize carrots and sticks far
117
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short of criminal punishment: a stern word from a teacher, a trip to the
principal’s   office,   a   bad   or   lukewarm   recommendation   letter for higher
education, withdrawal of privileges, detention, suspension. 123 In the
Progressive mindset, this system epitomizes why we set up schools as
miniature communities: it teaches children how to follow the law and
negotiate a justice system in a system that is both low-stakes but also has
more aspirational standards for behavior than the criminal law (respect for
adults, for example).124 Who can provide this service in an atomized
marketplace? And is there a way that families could be required to obtain
it?
Regulation of Third Party Assemblers
Public schools and districts will likely be the first institutions to offer to
act as educational general contractors; but they will not be the only ones.
It is almost certain that persons, firms, and other institutions will enter the
marketplace as agents for assembly.
Unbundling will therefore immediately demand very different state
school finance systems. The obvious conceptual framing for such
funding, already associated with voucher and charter schools, is to give
each student a budget that the student’s  family  could  then  use  to  assemble  
an educational program. Presumably, these grants would not be in cash
but in scrip, redeemable only by suppliers who meet government
requirements, and parents could not cash any balance remaining.
Government would have to assure that the budget was sufficient to
assemble a package that met the legal requirements of the education codes.
This goal could be met by some combination of ensuring that allocations
are sufficient, and price controls upon producers. Allocations could also
be made to vary by student. Today, some states use student-based funding
allocations that varies the per-pupil allocation to public schools based
upon whether students are disabled, live in poverty, or are Englishlanguage learners.125 Similar things could be done with allocations to
families. Voucher programs for the disabled provide an additional
model. 126
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Government will very likely interact with private bundlers beyond
paying for their services. And these institutions will likely be very
diverse. Some will be for-profit, offering their services to curate packages
ideal for particular children or particular types of children. One would
expect such services to seek market niches, much as charter and traditional
private schools do today: some will pitch to rich overachievers, some to
poor urban residents, some to rural students, some to the intellectually
gifted. It is also possible that non-religious ideological communities of
various kinds—socialists, separatists, populists, vegans?—will go into the
bundling business. But, almost surely, some private bundlers will be
churches and other religious entities, who will bundle for children in ways
that they promise will meet both state requirements and that will further
their doctrines and beliefs. Most of these bundles will contain religious
training that must be privately paid for or funded.
Religious bundlers will raise special, but familiar, issues. Can religious
bundlers incorporate into their bundles services paid for with public
money? Almost surely; the reasoning of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the
Cleveland voucher case, applies fairly directly.127 Any bundle they
created  would  receive  public  funds  only  because  of  parents’  “true  private  
choice.”128 Must they be allowed to do so? This is more debatable. The
better argument is that Locke v. Davey129 does not apply, and that to
prevent religiously affiliate bundlers from using publicly funded resources
would impermissibly discriminate against them. 130 This is especially true
because concerns about entanglement and endorsement are mitigated in
the unbundled context. If it becomes a basic organizing principle of
education that assembly and production are distinct, no reasonable
observer would infer state endorsement of religion from the inclusion of
both  religious  and  secular  components   in  a  particular  student’s   bundle  of  
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educational services.131 And, because each component could be produced
discretely, entanglement would not be a concern either.
In short, religious bundlers will be able to offer in the marketplace
packages that include both publicly funded secular components and other
components that are explicitly religious. To do so is at the core of the
right to free exercise, no different than the establishment of a religious
private school. The effect, however, is to encourage the creation of
institutions that look like religious schools but that receive public
funding—and this has long been a red line in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. Does unbundling make that red line untenable? I think it
does.
Both churches and non-religious ideologues might offer their services
for free or for cut rates; because they have nonpecuniary missions, they
might look to maximize their market penetration even if doing so meant
taking an economic loss. One would then become concerned that the
state-funded system of education systematically biases consumers in favor
of   selecting   religious   “assemblers.” 132 This, of course, would be the
converse of the current system, in which the system biases consumers
against religious education by making religious schools pay for secular
training without public support.133
Third-party bundlers who arise to respond to an unbundled regime
may, if they are successful, ultimately come to play many of the same
roles   today   played   by   the   institutions   we   know   today   as   “schools.”    
Almost everyone will use some bundler, religious or secular. The bundler
will make the major educational decisions under regulatory constraints;
parents will choose the bundler whose choices they prefer. Perhaps this
will bring us around full circle, to focusing regulation primarily upon that
single, assembling institution. We probably will not call these assembling
institutions   “schools.”      But   we   will   ask:      How   can   such   bundlers   be  
regulated, to what ends, and subject to what First-Amendment limits?
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